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## THE EARLY ENGLISH COLONIAL MOVEMENT

### II. *The economic theory of colonization*

IN addition to those settling in America, many Englishmen, who had no intention of leaving their homes, were keenly interested in the colonial movement. This large and heterogeneous body of men stimulated public opinion and was influential in securing the support of the Crown, without which the work could not have been undertaken. Many of these men had invested extensively in colonial enterprises, but, apart from their own personal interests, they had certain definite ideas as to the advantages that would accrue to their country from a policy of expansion. As has already been pointed out,<sup>1</sup> a number of them favored colonization as a remedy for over-population and social distress; but far more emphasis was laid on colonization as a means of quickening English commerce and of freeing England from what, according to the prevailing economic theories, was a dangerous dependence on rival nations.

English economic thought was dominated by mercantilistic doctrines, which laid an undue stress on the possession of the precious metals.<sup>2</sup> Gold and silver were looked upon as something apart and distinct from other commodities, as the very incarnation of wealth.<sup>3</sup> According to the prevailing economic creed, a country's welfare could be accurately gauged by its balance of trade. A favorable balance meant the importation

<sup>1</sup> POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. xxiii, pp. 83 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> "Since Moneys haue obtained the title of the sinewes of war, and the life of Commerce: I hope that the accumulating thereof may properly be called *The Prae-heminent study of Princes*, when the same is procured by Trade: which is the sole peaceable instrument to inrich Kingdomes and Common-weales." Malynes, *The Center of the Circle of Commerce* (London, 1623), preface, pp. A 2, 3.

<sup>3</sup> There was naturally some opposition to this crude, although popular, view. In 1625, it was asked: "Who gave Gold or Silver the Monopoly of wealth, or made them the Almighty favorites?" Virginias Verger, in *Purchas XIX*, p. 232. See also *Lescarbot*, in *Purchas XVIII*, p. 232.

of metals and consequently prosperity; an adverse one implied economic regression.<sup>1</sup>

From this viewpoint there could obviously be no greater national advantage than the discovery of rich mines within the body politic. There was absolutely no likelihood of such an event in England, but attention was directed to America in the hope of finding there, as Spain had done, valuable mines. At the outset this hope was ever present, and the clause in all the charters reserving to the Crown a certain proportion of such metals discovered in the colonies was by no means merely a formal one.<sup>2</sup> Before actual settlement had proven the contrary, it was believed that the precious metals abounded in America; it was even asserted that gold was more plentiful there than was copper in England.<sup>3</sup> The efforts of the early colonists in Virginia were directed with disastrous results toward finding such commodities,<sup>4</sup> and it took a number of years to convince them that this quest was futile. In 1609, Hakluyt still cherished the idea that Virginia would prove a treasure-house of gold, silver and precious stones.<sup>5</sup> Others recognized from the beginning that these hopes were illusory,<sup>6</sup> and as the settlement of America progressed, this idea inevitably became ever less prominent, until ultimately it disappeared.

The discovery of mines was not the only means of increasing

<sup>1</sup> "If the Natiue commodities exported doe waigh downe and exceed in value the forraine Commodities imported; it is a rule that neuer faile's, that then the Kingdom growe's rich, and prosper's in estate and stocke: because the ouerplus thereof must needs come in, in treasure." Misselden, *The Circle of Commerce* (London, 1623), p. 117.

<sup>2</sup> In 1584 Hakluyt said that unquestionably gold, silver, copper, pearls and precious stones had been found in America, and that such a share thereof as had been reserved to the Crown in Cabot's charter would amount to a considerable sum. Hakluyt, *Discourse*, p. 86. This portion usually amounted to one-fifth.

<sup>3</sup> Brown, *Genesis I*, p. 29.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* I, pp. 105, 106.

<sup>5</sup> In "Epistle Dedicatorie" to "Virginia Richly Valued, by a Portugall gentleman of Eluas" (London, 1609; also in *Force IV*, no. 1). For similar opinions, see Brown, *Genesis I*, p. 268 and II, pp. 562 *et seq.*

<sup>6</sup> Already in 1583, Carleill expressed doubts as to the probability of obtaining these metals from America. Hakluyt VIII, p. 141. In his essay, "Of Plantations," Bacon called attention to the uncertainty of such hopes and to their demoralizing influence. Bacon, *Works* (ed. Spedding, Ellis and Heath), XII, p. 196.

a country's stock of precious metals. The same end could be attained by the systematic regulation of foreign commerce, and, with this object in view, the statesmen of the day sought to discourage the importation of foreign merchandize and to facilitate English exports. But the economic development and natural resources of England were such that it was absolutely impossible to refrain from importing a considerable quantity of foreign products. At the time in question, England's import trade consisted of four distinct branches. In the first place, there was the Baltic trade with Sweden, Russia, Poland and Germany, whence came the naval stores necessary for her shipping and the potash used in England's basic industry, the woollen manufacture. From the standpoint of national security and of economic growth, this trade was all-important. A stoppage of these supplies, either through war or through their control by a rival, would prevent England from putting a fleet to sea and would also retard the development of her merchant marine. A second important branch of the English import trade was that with southern Europe, whence came, in large quantities, wine, silk, salt, sugar and dried fruits. Some of these commodities were essential, but others were in the nature of luxuries; and consequently this trade was deemed less important than that to the Far East, which supplied England with dyes, saltpeter and the spices that alone rendered the winter's stock of food palatable. These Eastern products, formerly controlled by Portugal, were now monopolized by the Dutch, who sold them to England at enhanced prices. Finally, although the English fishery was not an insignificant industry, a large proportion of the fish consumed was caught by foreigners and bought from them. To the statesmen and economists of the day, it was patent that it would be a distinct national advantage if England were not obliged to purchase these commodities from foreigners. Those which were imported from the Continent and from Asia could not be produced on English soil, and the Dutch were so firmly intrenched in the fisheries in the waters adjacent to England that it was a difficult task to compete with them. A remedy, however, could be found by direct commercial intercourse with India, by the development of an English

fishing industry in America, and by the production of those commodities hitherto purchased from other European nations in English colonies.

This desire to free England from the necessity of purchasing from foreigners formed the underlying basis of English commercial and colonial expansion; it led directly to the formation of the East India Company and to the colonization of America. Furthermore, the advisability of such a movement was emphasized by the existing precarious condition of English commerce. In his famous *Discourse concerning Western Planting*, written in 1584, Hakluyt described in detail this state of affairs. All intercourse with the Barbary states was vigorously opposed by the Spaniards, who confiscated the English vessels and subjected their crews to the Inquisition, "chardginge them that they bringe armour, munition, and forbidden merchandise to strengthen the infidells, against these partes of Christendome."<sup>1</sup> Direct commercial relations with Spain itself were extremely dangerous, on account of the war with that country and Philip II's inveterate opposition to Protestantism.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the comparatively new trade to Turkey was hazardous because of the Algerian pirates and the opposition of Venice; the French trade was declining owing to competition, to heavy taxes and to arbitrary government; while that with the Netherlands was injured by the prolonged struggle of the Dutch against Catholic Spain.<sup>3</sup> The trade with Germany and the Baltic countries was hampered by many factors. That to Germany was seriously interfered with by the withdrawal of the favors, which English merchants had hitherto enjoyed in that market, in retaliation for England's depriving the Hanse merchants of the privileges of the Steelyard in London.<sup>4</sup> Besides, Denmark not only imposed onerous charges on English vessels passing through the Sound,<sup>5</sup> but its control of this strategic waterway jeopardized English commercial interests in the Baltic. Finally, the new

<sup>1</sup> Hakluyt, *Discourse*, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 14. Cf. pp. 17, 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Cunningham, *English Industry II*, pp. 224-227; Ehrenberg, *Hamburg und England*, pp. 131-158.

<sup>5</sup> Hakluyt, *Discourse*, pp. 15, 16.

trade to Russia was already declining, owing to competition and to the fact the Muscovy Company no longer enjoyed its exemption from custom-duties in that country. This company, moreover, had to defray the expenses both of the Russian embassies to England and of those sent by England in return.<sup>1</sup>

During the three decades following Hakluyt's account, conditions did not improve, as is clearly shown in a conspicuously able pamphlet published in 1615, under the title of *The Trade's Increase*.<sup>2</sup> Its author looked with a gloomy eye upon English commerce, showing that the Russian trade had to a great extent been lost, while that to the Mediterranean had declined owing to the new trade route to India, the depredations of the pirates, and the competition of the Dutch—"the now Sea-herrs." Of the various remedies proposed for the relief of this precarious economic situation, that which found most favor was the adoption of a policy of colonial expansion.<sup>3</sup>

Thus the chief economic benefit that England expected to

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* p. 16. These statements are fully confirmed in Christopher Carleill's discourse of 1583. Therein attention was called to the fact that the Russian trade had cost the Muscovy Company a very large sum before it had become profitable, and that, at the time of writing, it had fallen "to very ticklish terms." This was due to many reasons: the fickleness of the Czar; Dutch competition; the cost of the embassies; the probability of a tribute being exacted in the Sound; the ill-will of the Easterlings. In addition, Carleill also pointed out how hazardous was the trade to Turkey, the Barbary states and Spain, and strongly recommended a diversion of English commercial interests to America. Hakluyt VIII, pp. 135-137.

<sup>2</sup> Harl. Misc. IV, p. 202. For England's trade to France, see Unwin, *Industrial Organization*, pp. 177, 178.

<sup>3</sup> As already noticed, Carleill used this argument. It was also the main idea in Hakluyt's discourse. The author of *The Trade's Increase*, however, suggested another remedy. He had some hopes that the Newfoundland fishery would develop satisfactorily, but he laid chief stress on the necessity of England wresting the control of the herring fishery from the Dutch. He wrote: "I cannot find any other worthy Place of foreign anchorage; for the Bermudas, we know not yet what they will do; and for Virginia, we know not well what to do with it." The former, he said, does not employ much shipping; and the latter is still in embryo, but it is "no Question, a worthy Enterprise, and of great Consequence, much above the Merchants Level and Reach." In view of the great expense, he thought that the London Company was to be commended for holding out so long, and he expressed the wish that all Englishmen would coöperate in the enterprise "to help to form and bring forth this Birth, not of an Infant, but of a Man; nay, of a People, of a Kingdom, wherein are many Kingdoms." Harl. Misc. IV, p. 209.

derive from colonial expansion was freedom from dependence on other European rivals, by obtaining direct access to the Far East, by the growth of the English fishing industry, and by the acquisition of fresh sources of supply. In other words, from the viewpoint of the state, it was to a great extent a movement designed to divert the four great branches of England's import trade from foreign into national channels. The exploring activity of the Elizabethan age was preponderantly devoted to finding a northern passage to China, India and the Spice Islands of the Pacific, by means of which England might obtain the exotic products of the East directly from her own subjects, and not at enhanced prices from the Portuguese and Dutch. This specific object led in 1600 to the formation of the East India Company, which maintained regular commercial relations with India by means of the Cape route. But in addition, this objective was very prominent in the colonial movement proper. But little was known of the interior geography of the continent, and for a considerable period America was regarded by many as a half-way house to the East. It was hoped that the occupation of American territory would give England an exclusive and short route to the Pacific. In 1583 and 1584, Peckham,<sup>1</sup> Carleill<sup>2</sup> and Hakluyt<sup>3</sup> called attention to the probability of such a result. This idea was also prominent at the time of the actual settlement, and it even retained its vitality for a number of years thereafter. In 1609 it was distinctly mentioned as one of the objects of the Virginia enterprise,<sup>4</sup> and it also occupied the minds of those entrusted with founding a settlement in New England under the charter of 1606.<sup>5</sup> In 1610 a report to the Spanish Council of State concerning English colonization stated that the English expected to find a passage from Virginia to the South Sea.<sup>6</sup> As late as 1623 George Sandys spoke of the probability of such a discovery,<sup>7</sup> and in the following year the colo-

<sup>1</sup> Hakluyt VIII, p. 140.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 112.<sup>3</sup> Hakluyt, Discourse, pp. 108 *et seq.*      <sup>4</sup> Nova Britannia, p. 22 (Force I, no. 6).<sup>5</sup> Letter of George Popham, dated Sagadahoc, December 13, 1607. Brown, Genesis I, p. 146.<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* p. 397. A few years thereafter, William Strachey likewise mentioned this as one of the probable advantages arising from Virginia. *Ibid.* pp. 562 *et seq.*<sup>7</sup> *Va. Mag. of Hist. and Biog.* VI, p. 243.

nizing company officially mentioned this as one of the advantages to be derived from Virginia.<sup>1</sup>

As the work of actual settlement in America progressed, the futility of this hope became patent, and England was forced to place sole reliance on the growth of her trade with India by the Cape route. In this way the colonial development proper was gradually divorced from the movement of commercial expansion in the Orient. Similarly, at the outset, one of the factors that gave a great impetus to the colonial movement was the desire to develop the English fishing industry. In the days of Elizabeth, the arch-enemy was Spain, which threatened England's national existence. In the succeeding era, that of the first two Stuarts, there slowly developed a consciousness of the fact that the United Provinces threatened to cramp England's development. The Spanish antagonism was largely political and religious; the Dutch rivalry was economic. In no respect was Dutch commercial supremacy more conspicuous and more galling to English pride than in the herring fisheries carried on in the waters surrounding England. Just as it had been recognized in the Elizabethan age that the mines of America constituted Spain's chief bulwark, so statesmen of the following era perceived that Dutch prosperity was founded on the herring fisheries.<sup>2</sup>

Fish constituted one of the chief elements of England's diet, but a large proportion of the quantity consumed was bought from foreigners, largely from the Dutch. According to Sir George Peckham, who wrote in 1583, English fishermen imported only one-third of the necessary supply.<sup>3</sup> As the Dutch were so firmly intrenched in the European industry, the attention of England was turned toward America as a means of remedying so disadvantageous a situation. With this object in view, it was urged that Sir Humphrey Gilbert's enterprise should not be allowed to remain barren, but that a colony be planted in Newfoundland.<sup>4</sup> In 1584, Hakluyt advised that possession be taken of this territory, and that England levy taxes on all foreign vessels fishing

<sup>1</sup> Virginia Co. II, p. 527; London Co. II, p. 265.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Cal. State Papers, Domestic, 1625-1649, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Hakluyt VIII, p. 110.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* Sir George Peckham.

there.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, as the regions to the south became better known, it was realized that here too could be developed an extensive fishery,<sup>2</sup> which might free England from her dependence on the Dutch. This desire to foster the English fisheries was an important underlying motive in the colonial movement. In the course of time it was seen, however, that the development of this English interest, both in Newfoundland and in New England, while necessitating an assertion of territorial sovereignty, was not contingent upon the settlement of large colonies in those countries, and that to some extent such communities interfered with the mother-country's direct interests in these industries. Hence gradually, as the settlement of America progressed, less stress was laid on this argument.

Just as it was anticipated that the colonial movement would free England from the necessity of purchasing Eastern products and fish from foreigners, so it was expected that America would furnish her with those commodities hitherto obtained from the Baltic and South European countries.<sup>3</sup> As this fundamental idea had important consequences both in shaping colonial policy and in directing the actual course of expansion, it will be advisable to examine its growth and development.

The colonial movement of the seventeenth and the commercial expansion of the preceding century were closely connected phenomena and were to a great extent based on the same motives. The attempts to find a northern passage to India were ultimately designed to free England from her dependence on the Portuguese.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, the main object of the large trading

<sup>1</sup> Hakluyt, *Discourse*, pp. 87, 88. Hakluyt said that 100 to 200 Spanish and Portuguese ships fished yearly at Newfoundland. *Ibid.* p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Virginia Co. II, p. 527; London Co. II, p. 265.

<sup>3</sup> Thus Captain John Smith wrote: "Muscovia and Polonia doe yeerely receive many thousands for Pitch, Tarre, Sope, ashes, Rosen, Flax, Cordage, Sturgeon, Masts, Yards, Wainscot, Firres, Glasse, and such like: also Swethland for Iron and Copper. France in like manner for Wine, Canvas, and Salt; Spaine as much for Iron, Steele, Figs, Reasons, and Sackes. Italy with Silkes and Velvets consume our chief commodities. Holland maintaines itselfe by Fishing and Trading at our owne doores. . . . Then how much hath Virginia the prerogative of all those flourishing Kingdoms, for the benefit of our Land, when as within one hundred miles all those are to bee had, either readie provided by nature, or else to be prepared, were there but industrious men to labour." Purchas XVIII, pp. 437, 438.

<sup>4</sup> In his discourse on the north-west passage, written in 1576, Sir Humphrey Gilbert

companies—with the exception naturally of the Merchant Adventurers—was to procure foreign products on more advantageous terms.<sup>1</sup> This close connection between the commercial and colonial movements is well illustrated in the discourse that Captain Christopher Carleill wrote in 1583, in order to persuade the Muscovy Company to direct its efforts toward America. He admitted that at the beginning this trade would necessarily be insignificant, but he prophesied that in a short time “there may be well expected from thence no lesse quantitie and diversitie of merchandise then is now had out of Dutchland, Italie, France, or Spain.”<sup>2</sup> From the northern parts of America, Carleill said England would obtain the naval stores and other products of the Baltic countries and also fish; <sup>3</sup> from the southern and western parts could be procured wine, olives, salt and other commodities which England was accustomed to purchase from southern Europe.

What Carleill and his fellow-workers had in mind was not the establishment of new communities on American soil, but the erection of trading posts which would facilitate the purchase of these supplies from the native population.<sup>4</sup> As America be-

devoted an entire chapter to the consideration of “what commodities would ensue, this passage once discovered.” He laid great emphasis on “the wonderfull commodities which this discovery may bring, especially to this realme of England,” but he naturally did not ignore that there would also result an increased outlet for English commodities, especially for cloth. Hakluyt VII, pp. 185-189.

<sup>1</sup> Thus the fact “that divers Marchandize of the same Countries are very necessary and convenient for the use and defence of this our Realme of England” appears in the charter of 1585 to the Barbary Company as the chief motive that induced Elizabeth to grant the patent. Hakluyt VI, p. 420.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* VIII, p. 140.

<sup>3</sup> Pitch, tar, hemp, masts, hides, furs, “without being in any sort beholding to a king of Denmarke, or other prince or state that shall be in such sort able to command our shippes at their pleasure, as those doe at this day, by meanes of their strait passages and strong shipping.” *Ibid.* p. 139.

<sup>4</sup> In 1583 also, Sir George Peckham advocated a similar extensive system of colonization, maintaining that America could furnish England with furs, silk, fish, fruits, wood, gold, silver, copper, lead, tin, jewels, naval stores, hemp, flax, dyes, feathers, etc. *Ibid.* VIII, pp. 115, 116. Similarly in 1584, Richard Hakluyt said “that this western voyage will yeele unto us all the commodities of Europe, Affrica and Asia, as far as wee were wonte to travell, and supplye the wantes of all our decayed trades.” Hakluyt, Discourse, p. 19. From the northern parts of America, he said, England could obtain masts, ship-timber, pitch, tar, resin, soap-ashes and hemp; from the

came better known, this scheme of extensive colonization was seen to be impracticable, and it was recognized that Englishmen would have to settle permanently in America and to exploit its resources themselves. But the underlying economic idea remained unchanged; the colony was to be primarily a source of supply for the metropolis. In 1606, at about the time when the first Virginia charter was issued, a remarkably able paper was written in favor of the government aiding the work of colonization.<sup>1</sup> The author thereof starts with the assertion that all kingdoms are maintained by rent or traffic, especially by the latter; and that England depends on her shipping both for her trade and her safety. Her shipping, the argument continues, necessitates a supply of naval stores, which England cannot produce, and which she obtains "only by the favor of forraigne potency." Consequently the government should undertake the work of colonization, because, if England had colonies "able to furnish our wantes," our money and merchandise that now go to strangers would go to kinsmen, from whom in return we should receive what we need, and the ensuing trade would be in its nature more "home bread trafique than a forraigne exchange." In addition, this writer advances the typically mercantilistic view, that a state which either has sufficient for itself, or can export its natural products to pay for its imports, is most complete and wealthy. Obviously, this ideal status would be attained if the establishment of colonies in America should free England from the necessity of purchasing from her European rivals.<sup>2</sup>

southern parts, besides the advantages of the fishery, could be procured a miscellaneous lot of commodities, including the precious metals, sugar, silks, wines, fruits and salt. *Ibid.* pp. 37, 38. In addition, Hakluyt emphasized the importance to England of America's forests, for English timber was scarce. *Ibid.* p. 105. In Ralph Lane's letter to Hakluyt, dated Virginia, Sept. 3, 1585, it was stated "that what commodities soever Spaine, France, Italy, or the East partes doe yeeld unto us, in wines of all sortes, in oyles, in flaxe, in rosens, pitch, frankensence, corrans, sugers, and such like, these parts doe abound with the growth of them all." Hakluyt VIII, p. 319. Cf. also Thomas Heriot's account, *ibid.* pp. 348 *et seq.*

<sup>1</sup> Brown, Genesis I, pp. 36-39.

<sup>2</sup> This idea is prominent in a dispatch regarding the Virginia enterprise written in 1606 by the Spanish ambassador to his government. Therein he said: "They claim to be able to obtain from the country higher up than the Island of St. Helena, the

The same argument was prominently used in all the writings in favor of the Virginia enterprise.<sup>1</sup> In 1610 the colonizing company laid special stress on the fact that Virginia could provide England with supplies otherwise obtainable only "at the courtesie of other Princes, under the burthen of great Customs, and heavy impositions," such as copper, iron, steel, ship-timber, masts, cordage and soap-ashes.<sup>2</sup> In another official statement of the company, likewise of the year 1610,<sup>3</sup> the natural resources of Virginia were described with enthusiasm and in great detail. Especial attention was called to its wealth of forests, from which could be obtained potash, pitch, tar, lumber and masts; to its iron deposits, its furs, wines, dyes and drugs. Furthermore, it was asserted that Virginia was adapted to the production of oranges, sugar, rice, as well as of the other products of southern Europe, and that consequently in future these "may be supplied to us in our owne countrey, and by our owne industry."<sup>4</sup> In

same commodities as from Spain, because it is under the same latitude, so as not to be in need of it;" that is, so as not to need the products of Spain. Brown, *Genesis* I, p. 89.

<sup>1</sup> Thus, in 1609, in his sermon in favor of Virginia, Richard Crakanthorpe said that the colony was so rich and fertile that "besides the sufficiency it naturally yields for itself, [it] may with best convenience supply some of the greatest wants and necessities of these Kingdoms." Brown, *Genesis*, I, p. 256. Daniel Price, the author of a similar sermon, "Saules Prohibition Staide," emphasized the same idea; after an extravagant enumeration of the commodities that might be expected from Virginia, he said the colony could furnish "whatsoever commodity England wanteth." *Ibid.* I, p. 312. In the same year also Hakluyt said that cotton, silk and dyeing materials could be obtained from Virginia. *Virginia Richly Valued* (London, 1609), Epistle Dedicatorie. The same line of thought is also prominent in Crashaw's sermon of 1610. Brown, *Genesis* I, p. 363. Similarly, about 1612, Strachey asserted that Virginia would prove a source of naval stores "so dearely obteyned from the easterly Countries." *Ibid.* II, pp. 562 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> "A True and Sincere declaration of the purpose and ends of the Plantation begun in Virginia," in Brown, *Genesis*, I, p. 340. Later in the same document, assurance is given that the colony would furnish England also with wine, pitch, dyes, silk-grass and pearls. *Ibid.* p. 349.

<sup>3</sup> "A True Declaration of the estate of the Colonie in Virginia," in Force III, no. 1. See also Purchas XIX, p. 71.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21. In general it was claimed that Virginia would free England from the necessity of purchasing from her European rivals. It was asserted that Virginia could furnish England with caviar and oil, hitherto obtained from Russia; with sturgeon, hitherto imported from the East countries; with soap-ashes and potashes, which were becoming scarce in Prussia; with masts, naval stores, flax and hemp, whose

1620 also, the company claimed that instead of having to buy furs, cordage and caviar in Russia; masts, timber, pitch, tar, potash and hemp in Norway, Denmark, Poland and Germany; wine, fruit and salt in Spain and France; silk in Persia and Italy, England could obtain all these products from Virginia; and furthermore, that the colony could provide iron, dyes, drugs, cotton and sugar.<sup>1</sup>

The same basic idea was equally conspicuous in the arguments advanced in favor of the settlement of the territory north of Virginia. In 1622, the Council of New England called attention to the fact that this region could supply England with fish, furs, hemp, silk, naval stores, timber, and that, "in a word, there comes no commodity out of *France, Germany, or the Sound*, but may be had there, with reasonable labour and industry."<sup>2</sup> The pamphlets published in favor of the settlement of New England placed marked stress on its value as a new source of supply, especially of fish, timber and naval stores.<sup>3</sup> Especial emphasis was laid on the probability of New England

supply was endangered by the wars between Poland and Muscovy; with wines and fruits, hitherto imported from southern Europe. It was pointed out that this last trade was entirely at the mercy of hostile princes, "who for their proper utility devise all courses to grinde our merchants, all pretences to confiscate their goods, and to draw from us al marrow of gaine by their inquisitiue inuentions." *Ibid.* pp. 22, 23. Similarly, the author of a pamphlet published in 1609 in support of the Virginia enterprise, wrote glowingly of the resources of the colony, of its forests, its mineral deposits, its rich soil. He claimed that Virginia could supply England with naval stores, timber, rice, sugar, dyes, drugs, wine, silk, potash, furs, fish, caviar, iron, copper, gold, silver, *etc.*—a heterogeneous list, which, if the prophecy had proven true, would have done away with the bulk of England's import trade from foreign countries. *Nova Britannia*, in *Force I*, no. 6, pp. 11–22. This argument was also fully developed in Virginia's *Verger* (1625), whose author enumerated the commodities that the colony could supply, such as timber, silk, wine, naval stores, *etc.*, for which "many thousands are yeerely expended to the profits of strangers." Consequently, he concluded: "Virginia inviteth our hopes . . . so that we shall save those treasures and costs that way expended, shall lesse depend on other Nations." *Purchas XIX*, pp. 245–251.

<sup>1</sup> "A Declaration of the State of the Colonie and Affaires in Virginia," in *Force III*, no. 5, pp. 1–4.

<sup>2</sup> *A briefe Relation of the Discovery and Plantation of New England* (London, 1622), p. 27; *Baxter, Gorges I*, p. 231.

<sup>3</sup> *New Englands Plantation* (London, 1630), pp. 7, 8, in *Force I*, no. 12; *The Planters Plea* (London, 1630), ch. iv, p. 15, in *Force II*, no. 3.

producing these stores, which, according to a writer of the day, were such "usefull commodities, that if wee had them not from other Countries in Amity with England, our Navigation would decline. Then how great the commodity of it will be to our Nation, to have it of our owne, let any man judge."<sup>1</sup>

It is thus clearly apparent that the chief advantage anticipated from a policy of territorial expansion was greater economic independence from foreign nations through the development of new sources of supply under the English flag.<sup>2</sup> The predominance of this idea was a direct consequence of the prevailing economic theories and of the conditions existing in England's foreign trade. This view was also strengthened by other factors. The native population of America was too sparse and too poor to furnish a large market for English manufactures, and it was realized that an Englishman who settled in America would not, merely by this fact, increase his powers of consumption. Furthermore, the colonial movement was financed by individuals who naturally desired some return on their investment.<sup>3</sup> This

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Morton, *New English Canaan* (London, 1632), pp. 43, 44, in *Force II*, no. 5. Cf. also pp. 45, 46, 58, 59, 64. On December 10, 1633, Emanuel Downing wrote to Secretary Coke that, if the Massachusetts Bay Company were allowed to enjoy the rights under their patent, "then shall this kingdome clearly gaine by the fruits of their labors that commodious trade of cordage, pitch and tarr." Coke MSS.

<sup>2</sup> In 1613, Robert Harcourt published a pamphlet in favor of founding a colony in Guiana, in which he stated that, in every foreign action, regard ought to be paid to three chief ends: the glory of God, the honor of the sovereign and the benefit and profit of the nation. He claimed that this enterprise would answer the last end, for "who can deny, but that our Country by this worthy Action may be enriched, through divers and sundry Commodities of great Worth, in those Parts daily found, and easily obtained?" *A Relation of a Voyage to Guiana* (London, 1613), in *Harl. Misc. VI*, p. 476. Purchas XVI, p. 402, omits this part of the pamphlet. That this idea was dominant is also evident from the writings of Gorges. When describing the benefits that foreign nations had derived from colonies, he emphasized the fact that valuable commodities had been obtained from them, and that it was their success which induced England to follow the lead of Spain and Portugal. Virginia, he thought, would prove useful, as it could produce flax, hemp, pitch and tar, if not sugar and cotton. New England likewise, according to Gorges, would prove advantageous in a number of ways, because of its rich soil, its mineral deposits and its furs. Gorges, *A Briefe Narration*, pp. 59, 60. Similarly, in a petition of 1641, the suitability of North America for colonization was demonstrated by the fact that it could produce silk, vines, cotton, tobacco, furs, timber, metals and naval stores. *A Petition of W. C. exhibited to the High Court of Parliament*, p. 6, in *Force I*, no. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Consequently the attention of those directing the settlements in America was

they could obtain only by the development of America's natural resources. In this way theory and fact reinforced one another, and, as a result, the colony was looked upon mainly as a source of supply, and its value was gauged by its conformity with this ideal.<sup>1</sup>

The idea that the colony was to be a source of supply implied, however, inevitably that it was also to be a market for English produce. One conception was the natural corollary to the other, and consequently the value of colonies as an outlet for the mother country's manufactures was by no means ignored. At the outset of the movement, a few decades before Elizabeth's death, when but little was known of America's native population, it was expected that trade with the Indians would develop a considerable market for English manufactures.<sup>2</sup> Thus in 1583, Carleill maintained that the colonization of America would result in "a very liberall utterance of our English clothes" and of other manufactures into a country larger than all Europe.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, in the following year Richard Hakluyt, after calling attention to the rigors of the North American climate, said: "Nowe if her Majestie take these Western discoveries in hande, and plante there, yt is like that in shorte time wee shall vente as great a masse of clothe yn those partes as ever wee did in the Netherlandes, and in tyme moche more."<sup>4</sup>

primarily directed toward finding out what could be shipped thence to England. Thus, in 1607, George Popham wrote from Sagadahoc that the natives affirmed that the country produced nutmegs, mace, cinnamon, pitch, Brazil woods, cochineal, ambergris, besides many other valuable products. Brown, *Genesis I*, p. 146. See also Gorges's letter of December 1, 1607, in Baxter, *Gorges III*, pp. 154-157.

<sup>1</sup> It was also recognized that if the colonies produced more than England could consume, this surplus could be exported to foreign countries and would appear as a credit item in England's trade balance. Nova Britannia, p. 16, in Force I, no. 6; Virginia's Verger, in Purchas XIX, p. 251. Similarly it was perceived that a colony which was supplied with manufactures by England and produced commodities not wanted in the mother country, might still be advantageous by exporting these products to foreign markets, where they would pay for supplies needed by England. Thus, in 1638, Gorges wrote to Secretary Windebank that the exports of fish and lumber from the American colonies to Spain, Madeira and the Canaries paid for commodities imported from these places into England. Baxter, *Gorges III*, pp. 287-291.

<sup>2</sup> In 1583, Peckham advanced this argument. Hakluyt VIII, pp. 111-112.

<sup>3</sup> Hakluyt VIII, p. 140.

<sup>4</sup> Hakluyt, *Discourse*, p. 41. See also pp. 36-42.

This argument<sup>1</sup> was less prominently used after the size and poverty of America's native population became better known. It was, however, never lost sight of,<sup>2</sup> and it was to some extent strengthened by the fact that England's European rivals were energetically striving to create national industries which would enable them to dispense with English manufactures.<sup>3</sup> The main emphasis was, however, not laid on this phase; that a new market would be opened for English manufactures was regarded merely as the natural sequel to the fact that the colony would be able to furnish England with commodities hitherto purchased from foreigners.<sup>4</sup>

It was also expected that the development of new sources of supply and of broader markets would result in a greater volume of trade, which in turn would imply an increase in England's shipping interests. As merchant ships were usually heavily armed and constituted an important part of the navy, it followed that colonization would increase England's sea power, upon which national security chiefly depended. This general line of reasoning was frequently used in the contemporary publications.<sup>5</sup> In 1584 Hakluyt complained that despite the Navigation Acts and the encouragement given to the fishery, the mercantile

<sup>1</sup> In a pamphlet published in 1609 in support of the Virginia enterprise, after an enumeration of the commodities obtainable there, it was stated: "But of all other things, that God hath denied that countrie, there is want of sheepe to make woollen cloth, and this want of cloth must alwaies bee supplied from England, whereby when the Colony is thorowly increased, and the *Indians* brought to our Ciuitie (as they will in short time), it will cause a mighty vent of *English* clothes, a great benefit to our Nation, and raising againe of that auncient trade of clothing, so much decayed in England." *Nova Britannia*, p. 22, in Force I, no. 6.

<sup>2</sup> In 1610, it was advanced by the London Company. Force III, no. 1, p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> On account of these attempts, it was maintained in 1606 that England must "prepare a place fit for the vent of our wares." Brown, *Genesis* I, pp. 36-39.

<sup>4</sup> The same general argument was used in favor of colonization by Scotsmen. Thus, in 1624, Sir William Alexander wrote in connection with his proposed colony of New Scotland: "And where the *Scottish* Merchants before had no trade but by transporting Commodities that might haue beene employed at home, and oftentimes monie, to bringe backe Wine from *France*, and Pitch, Tarre, and Timber from the Easter Seas. Now only by exporting of men, Corne, and Cattle, they may within a little time be able to furnish back in exchange these things before named." *An Encouragement to Colonies* (London, 1624), p. 39, in Slaffer, Alexander, pp. 206, 207.

<sup>5</sup> See, e. g., Gilbert's Discourse, in Hakluyt VII, p. 187.

marine, "which is the strength of our realme," had decayed; he maintained that colonization would surely avert this evil, because the American voyages required large ships, and because Newfoundland could furnish England with naval stores.<sup>1</sup> Twenty-five years later, it was again asserted that England's shipping interest was declining, and that colonization was necessary to revive it.<sup>2</sup> In addition it was seen that, while colonization would result in increased sea power, this in turn implied greater ability to acquire and control colonies, for due recognition was given to the fact that a policy of expansion had to be based upon adequate naval strength.<sup>3</sup>

As a natural sequel it followed also that colonization would add to the general prosperity, and consequently that the national revenue would increase. This last factor was influential in gaining and retaining the support of the Crown. It was taken for granted that the dominions beyond the sea were to be outside the barriers of the English fiscal system, and that goods exported to the colonies, as well as those imported thence, would have to pay customs duties.<sup>4</sup>

The most potent and fundamental of the various economic reasons advanced in order to justify a policy of expansion was, however, the expectation of finding new sources of supply, in order to make England independent of foreign nations. At the very outset, there was a clearly defined tendency toward the creation of a self-sufficient commercial empire. It fol-

<sup>1</sup> Hakluyt, Discourse, pp. 89, 90. In 1583, Peckham used identically the same argument. Hakluyt VIII, p. 110. Cf. also Gorges, A Briefe Narration, p. 63; London Co. II, p. 265; Baxter, Gorges III, p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> It was pointed out that many English ships were being sold to foreigners, and that, for want of employment, English mariners were emigrating to foreign countries. Colonization, it was asserted, would remedy this condition and "make this little Northerne corner of the world, to be in short time the richest Store-house and staple for marchandize in all Europe." Nova Britannia, pp. 21, 22, in Force I, no. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Bacon said that Spain's "Greatness consisteth in their Treasure, their Treasure in their *Indies*, and their *Indies*, if it be well weighed, are indeed but an Accession to such as are Masters by Sea, so as this Axletree, whereupon their Greatness turneth, is soon cut in two, by any that shall be stronger than they by Sea." Considerations touching a War with *Spain*, in Harl. Misc. V, p. 91.

<sup>4</sup> In 1584, Hakluyt pointed out that, in addition to the customs duties, the Crown's revenue would be increased by the reservation of a portion of the precious metals, and by the imposition of a tax on all foreigners fishing at Newfoundland. Hakluyt, Discourse, pp. 86-88.

lowed that the course of colonization was directed toward regions most likely to answer this end. On the one hand this led to the formation of the East India Company; on the other, it led to colonial experiments in the North and in South America, as well as in the West Indies. Of the four great branches of England's import trade, the most vital was that with the Baltic countries, whence came the indispensable naval stores.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, the earliest and most strenuous efforts were devoted toward developing colonies that would be able to compete in these products with northern Europe. Accordingly, during the reign of the first two Stuarts, attention was mainly directed toward the colonization of the temperate regions in America that could supply pitch, tar and hemp.<sup>2</sup> As the attempts of the early settlers to produce these commodities were unmitigated failures, there developed toward the end of this period a marked tendency in favor of tropical colonization, by means of which England could obtain an abundant supply of exotic products, not only, nor even chiefly, for home consumption, but for export, to pay for commodities that England was forced to purchase abroad.

Finally, as far as colonial policy was concerned, there followed an important consequence from this view of the utility of colonies. Inasmuch as colonies were chiefly valued as sources of supply, and as the state assumed grave responsibilities in sanctioning the movement, it would have been considered the height of folly to allow the colony to send its produce to any place but the metropolis. Consequently, very early in the history of the Empire, it became the established custom to confine the colony's exports to the mother country, for otherwise the chief object of the government in permitting the movement would have been nullified.

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<sup>1</sup> In 1641, Sir Thomas Roe said in Parliament that this trade was "the Root of all others, because the Materials, brought from those Parts . . . are fundamental, and of absolute Necessity." *Harl. Misc.* IV, p. 415. In the report to Charles I on Canada, dated November 24, 1630, special stress was laid on its capacity to supply hemp, tar, pitch, masts and ship-timber. *Brit. Mus. Egerton MSS.* 2395, folio 19.

<sup>2</sup> This tendency was reinforced by the fact that the best fishery was also in this region.